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MEETING THE ENEMY
Stephen C. Yeazell*
INTRODUCTION
Only those who deeply understand popular culture can legitimately
critique such engaging papers. Unable to claim such understanding, I
invoke two experts in the field, both of whom offer pertinent com-
ments. The late Walt Kelly, the cartoonist behind Pogo,1 supplies a
frame of reference for Professors Gary Fine and Patricia Turner's leg-
ends of corporate malfeasance, 2 and Marc Galanter's jokes about con-
niving claimants and lawyers. 3 As Pogo once stated, "we have met the
enemy and he is us."' 4 The jokes and legends strike chords because we
recognize in them our own fears and impulses; were "we" not recog-
nizable in them, there would be no startle of recognition. The second
comment comes from Russell Baker, for many years the New York
Times' resident satirist, who was once asked why so many of his news-
paper columns on public affairs were funny.5 Baker explained that
the things he wrote about were much too important to be treated seri-
ously.6 These two papers make the same point: they deal with truths
about ourselves that are too deep to be dealt with in the cold light of
day, truths that are acceptable only when wrapped in legend and hu-
mor.7 Nevertheless, my charge as a commentator requires a descent
from the land of smiles and knowing nods to the business of analysis.
That analysis involves two observations and one question.
II. JOKES, LEGENDS, AND SOCIAL BOUNDARIES
The legends and jokes remind us of something we know equally
well from law and society studies, that blaming and claiming are in-
* Professor of Law, University of California Los Angeles School of Law; J.D., Harvard Uni-
versity School of Law, 1974; M.A., Columbia University, 1968; B.A., Swarthmore College, 1967.
1. See WALT KELLY, OUTRAGEOUSLY POGO (1985).
2. Gary Alan Fine & Patricia Turner, Contemporary Legend and Claims of Corporate Malfea-
sance: Race, Fried Chicken, and the Marketplace, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 635 (2000).
3. Marc Galanter, The Conniving Claimant, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 647 (2000).
4. See KELLY, supra note 1, at 114.
5. RUSSELL BAKER, RUSSELL BAKER'S BOOK OF AMERICAN HUMOR 576 (1993).
6. See id.
7. Fine & Tlrner, supra note 2; Galanter, supra note 3.
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tensely social phenomena. Both papers explore the cultural roots of
that truth, laying bare its implications.8 More precisely, the papers
explore the borderlands between blaming and claiming.9 They ask
and explain, in the oblique way jokes and legends pose and answer
questions, why some claims are brought and others are not.10
The United States legal system is intensely permeable, and there-
fore, in a constantly roiled state. The decline of fact pleading, the
flowering of the contingency fee, the abundant supply of lawyers, the
persistence of the civil jury, the tradition of judicial review, and the
relatively effective enforcement of damage awards, all mean that to an
extent greater than in any other legal system in a developed economy,
the system allows a magnificent variety of claims to come before its
courts.'' The United States legal system lies closer to the centers both
of political power and of the popular heartstrings than its peers.12 It
seems implausible to imagine that if a civil rights movement were to
begin in France or Japan, it would start in the court system.13 It seems
similarly unlikely that widespread German concern about unsafe
products would first manifest itself in lawsuits, rather than the
Bundestag or in the Amt.' 4
This permeability has consequences. For our purposes, the most sa-
lient consequence is that we are prone to both over- and under-claim-
ing in ways that appear random, unless one considers the cultural
factors explored in these two papers. Consider two examples, both
involving the intersection of law and medicine. Paul Weiler's splendid
analysis of the medical practice draws on careful medical studies to
demonstrate that patients "under-blame," bringing medical malprac-
8. Fine & Turner, supra note 2; Galanter, supra note 3.
9. Fine & Turner, supra note 2; Galanter, supra note 3.
10. Fine & Turner, supra note 2; Galanter, supra note 3.
11. See Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public
Institutions, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1265, 1265-66 ("American culture [is] so peculiarly suffused with
legalism that ... [iut is not surprising that such people should experience high rates of litigation
.. .. .).
12. See id. at 1266 ("[T]he boundaries between the [American] legal system and the political
and social systems should be ... permeable.").
13. See Louis M. Avcoin, Judicial Review in France: Access of the Individual under French and
European Law in the Aftermath of France's Rejection of Bicentennial Reform, 15 B.C. INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 443, 443-44 (1992) ("[u]nderlying the philosophy of legislative supremacy... has
characterized the French legal system since the French Revolution."); Jahirih V. Lee, Review
Essay: Contemporary Scholarship on Global Law in the People's Republic of China, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 439, 441 (2000) (Even in Britain and Japan... difficulties arise in implementing policy
through law ....").
14. See generally Hartwin Bungert, Compensating Harm to the Defective Product Itself-A
Comparative Analysis of American and German Products Liability Law, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1179
(1992).
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tice claims for only about two percent of the instances where physi-
cians would ascribe an outcome to suboptimal practice. 15 In terms of
over-claiming, we find, in Peter Huber's polemic on junk science, an
account of the era when physicians believed that cancer could be
caused by external trauma, with the reported result that one can find
cases from the first half of this century in which damage awards were
made on the basis of what we would now find fanciful causality. 16
Seventy-five years ago, people brought, and courts validated, claims
that now look silly. 17 Today, in spite of heated rhetoric suggesting
over-claiming in medical malpractice, we find patients suing in far
fewer cases than one might expect.' 8 Only the social context from
which these claims arise, or fail to arise, can explain these phenom-
ena.' 9 Both papers, by reminding us of our captivity to culture, illumi-
nate the distribution of claims. 20
Marginal social groups frequently hold outlier views of society.2'
Even when these groups do not hold such views, almost by definition,
they are believed by others to hold such views.22 At the turn of the
century, when Jews were a marginal and often despised class, we find
jokes expressing the belief of the majority in the Jewish propensity to
bring unfounded claims. 23 "Ordinary" Americans of the 1930s were
prepared to believe that a streetcar accident could produce a tumor.24
Americans were also prepared to believe that the Jewish immigrants
aboard that streetcar were likely to bring suit whether or not they had
been harmed.25 Galanter's jokes thus tell us what "we" thought and
15. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRAC-
"rcE LITIGATION, AND PATIENr COMPENSATION 73 (1993).
16. PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 98-99
(1988). Huber reports that "[c]ourt dockets were soon crowded with claims that a blow received
... had caused cancer some time later." Id. The notes to this assertion cite medical and legal
articles but not cases. Id. at 240.
17. See id. at 98-99 (discussing the legal field's interest in "traumatically induced cancer" dur-
ing the early to mid-1900's).
18. See WEILER, supra note 15, at 139-141.
19. See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike In Hell: Contemporary Legands About the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARiz. L. REv. 717, 744-47 (1998) (media has caused society to perceive an overesti-
mated amount of medical malpractice claims).
20. Fine & Turner, supra note 2; Galanter, supra note 3.
21. See J. BUTrON, BLACKS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 236-41 (1989) (unconventional politics are
important in mobilizing and making visible the claims of disadvantaged groups).
22. See KATHERINE TATE, FROM PROTEST TO POLITICS: THE NEW BLACK VOTERS IN AMERI-
CAN ELECTIONS 33-38 (1994) (noting that race is often associated with differing views across a
broad range of issues).
23. Galanter, supra note 3.
24. Jarvis v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 72 N.Y.S. 829 (1901) (discussing New York jury verdict
in favor of a plaintiff alleging injuries suffered in a streetcar accident cause his tumor).
25. Galanter, supra note 3.
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think about "them," and incidentally, who "we" and "they" were and
are.
26
Marginal groups, scorned and made the butt of jokes, seek to ex-
plain their oppressed position, even if they do not believe that the law
can help.27 At the bottom of the social ladder, a person who is
scorned and denigrated by many others may feel that there are power-
ful, shadowy forces arrayed against her. In a society that allowed the
Tuskegee subjects to languish with untreated syphilis, 28 an African-
American need not be paranoid to suppose that some people in places
of power bear him ill will. How this ill will is manifested, the use of
profits to fund oppression (the Crown air freshener story),29 or the
theft of valuable intellectual property from employees (one of the
Kentucky Fried Chicken stories),30 matters less than the perception
that powers are thus arrayed. Moreover, for those interested in civil
litigation, these legends reveal as much in what they do not say, as in
what they do say. In Fine and Turner's legends, race determines
whether the injured will merely blame or whether she will also
claim.3' The legends also tell us about race in a market economy.32 In
the world of the legends, those who bite into a Kentucky Fried Rat
will successfully claim.33 In this case, the person's status as a con-
sumer, not one's race, is the critical factor. The market can dissolve
racial boundaries. However, race sometimes makes a difference. For
example, in the legendary account of the Kentucky Fried Chicken
chicken recipe stolen from an African-American servant, there is no
claim and no settlement (blame yes, claim no).34 When the legendary
African-American inventor contemplates use of the legal system in
such a case, the odds are daunting. Only when race is subsumed
within the broader category of the consumer, does folk wisdom imag-
ine a successful claim. These legends do not envision the legal system
as a form of redress for racially directed harms. Black consumers re-
cover simply as consumers when they bite into the Kentucky Fried
Rat, but they do not recover as victims of racial bias when socially
dominant whites finance the Klu Klux Klan or steal intellectual prop-
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Fine & Turner, supra note 2.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Fine & Turner, supra note 2.
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erty. Jokes and legends tell us who's in and who's out, and how that
status will affect the results expected from the legal system.
III. LAWYERS AS CULTURAL BROKERS
Insiders believe outsiders are abusing the system, making false
claims and using the system, not for redress, but rather, for profit.
Outsiders believe insiders are using the system to abuse them, sound-
ing like a form of incipient class warfare. Fortunately, however, we
are saved by our perception of a common enemy, an enemy who is
crafty, powerful, and mendacious. I speak, of course, of lawyers. As
Marc Galanter has so wonderfully illustrated, lawyers have displaced
Jews, Norwegians, people of color, and assorted other present or past
marginal members of society as the object of scorn and fear to whom
we can attribute mendacity and lawlessness.35 How wonderful! A co-
hesive society achieved by driving the scapegoat out of the city and
onto the hill. Beyond marveling at this social resourcefulness, what
can one say?
First, one might note that contempt for lawyers is a durable social
phenomenon. C.W. Brooks' book on the Sixteenth Century legal pro-
fession takes its title from a contemporary reference to lawyers: Pet-
tyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth.36 However, just beyond
this apparently eternal contempt lie some recent changes in the pro-
fession, changes that explain why we might shift our gaze from the
claimants to the lawyers as the source of unfounded claims and jokes
about lawyers. In the last fifty years, virtually all traces of resistance
to the contingent fee have disappeared, and the plaintiffs' bar has be-
come better capitalized and more legally sophisticated. 37 The plain-
tiffs' bar can bring and prosecute claims that no plaintiff's lawyer
would have dreamed of at the start of this century. 38 In the recent
asbestos class actions, plaintiffs' lawyers were described as holding
"inventories" of cases, in much the same way that an auto manufac-
turer might have inventories of cars, except that in this case a large
35. Galanter, supra note 3.
36. C.W. BROOKS, PETTYFOGGERS AND VIPERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH : THE "LOWER
BRANCH" OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 139 (1986).
37. Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and its Discon-
tents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 469 (1998); See also Lawrence M. Friedman & Thomas D. Rus-
sell, More Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Litigation, 1901-1910, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 295, 310-
13 (1990).
38. Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-makers: Recent California Experience with
"New" Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 455, 470 (1999).
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inventory was better than a small one. 39 In some categories of cases,
the sort Galanter's jokes describe, lawyers are the principal movers,
and thus, the appropriate targets of such jokes.40
Beneath these recent changes however, lies the more durable layer.
For years Anglo-American society has viewed lawyers with suspicion
because lawyers remind us of our divisions, and even worse, they
profit from those divisions. 41 Lawyers in our society often serve as
brokers between social strata, especially in the types of cases that pro-
duce these splendid jokes.4 2 The jokes are not about secured transac-
tions or mergers gone sour; they are about vertical litigation and
individuals claiming, often wrongfully, against entities. 43 In such dis-
putes, lawyers serve as cultural brokers, moving across economic and
social lines to bring and defend claims between parties who ordinarily
have little to say to one another. No one likes a broker, any broker.
Stock brokers, real estate brokers, and claims adjusters do not have
large fan clubs. As a result, we should not be surprised that lawyers,
who serve as cultural brokers, have not attracted much applause from
anyone other than themselves. Moreover, in a society that now pays
at least lip service to social inclusion, it is much easier to blame exces-
sive litigiousness on a profession rather than on a racial or ethnic
group.
IV. WHERE ARE THE CONTRACTS?
Focusing on the brokering role of lawyers also allows us to ask a
question about these jokes and legends: where are the promises and
the contracts? Whatever the popular images, we know that contem-
porary civil litigation is heavily contractual.4 4 Small claims dockets
are heavily weighted toward debt collection actions, and the general
civil docket is almost equally divided between tort and contract.45 But
the jokes and legends do not reflect this statistical world. Rather, the
jokes almost exclusively come from the world of torts. Even in the
subcategory of false insurance claims (where the asserted liability is
39. Kutak Symposium: Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, GEO. T. J. LE-
GAL E-mcs 344 (2000), citing Anchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997).
40. Galanter, supra note 3.
41. Joseph D. Jamail, Advocacy and Lawyers and Their Role, Speech Delivered at the Inau-
guration of the Matt Dawson Endowed Lecture Series (Feb. 14, 1995), in 47 BAYLOR L. REV.
1159, 1162 (1995).
42. Note, Lawyering for Social Change, 27 FORDHAM URn. L. 1969 (2000).
43. See Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes
and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIn. L. REV. 805, 828 (1998).
44. See, e.g., BRIAN OSTROM, ET AL., ExAMrNrNG, rm WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1995: A
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 8 (1996).
45. Id.
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contractual), the claim is fraudulent and there is no disagreement
about the meaning of contract because it is a repudiation of the whole
premise of contract.46 Why does this disproportion exist?
The trait is not inherent. Promises can be the content of myth and
legend. At least two of the world's religions are founded on the idea
of a covenant. 47 Why then are the jokes and legends not about bro-
ken promises? A tentative answer may lie in the boundary-crossing
role of contract. Contract, in theory, and sometimes in fact, enables
people to cross boundaries created by different values. 48 Indeed, con-
tract thrives on differential valuation because such differences create
the impetus to contract. 49 Only when we do not see things quite the
same way, or value the object identically, can we "bargain" (a term
derived from an Old French word whose meanings include "dispute"
and "hesitate"). 50 Dispute and hesitate are two things that we do
when we encounter the unknown. However, when a contract works, it
eliminates the differences, gaps, and surprises that make jokes funny.
A joke depends on misunderstanding. 51 If we negotiate an agree-
ment about what we will do, and I intentionally fail to do it, that is not
a joke. Such a scenario is a lie, or maybe worse, but it is not funny.
Contracts are about identifying and compromising divergent frames of
reference, synchronizing expectations, and overcoming differences. 52
With those differences overcome, however, we lack the space for so-
cial misunderstanding, for cultural divides that produce the sudden,
the unexpected, and the funny. To put matters hyperbolically, con-
tract destroys the urban legend and the joke about claimants because
it brings the parties into frames of reference close enough that diver-
gence may cause anger rather than laughter.
V. CONCLUSION
What shall we make of this? Legends are about shared understand-
ings. Jokes are about not-quite shared understandings. Since civil liti-
46. 7 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 35:108 (2nd ed. 1985).
47. Joseph Allegretti, Lawyers, Clients, and Covenant: A Religious Perspective on Legal Prac-
tice and Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1117 (1998).
48. Kermit L. Hall, LAW, ECONOMY AND THE POWER OF CONTRACT iX (1987).
49. Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 917, 947 (1974), reprinted in Kermit L. Hall, LAW, ECONOMY, AND TH POWER OF CON-
TRACT, 207, 237 (1987).
50. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 75 (C.T. Onions ed., Oxford Univer-
sity Press 1966).
51. See John W. Cooley, Joke Structure: A Source of Creative Techniques for Use in Media-
tions, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 85, 88 (1998).
52. Horwitz, supra note 49, at 237.
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gation in the United States is so deeply embedded in our culture, in
our shared understandings and misunderstandings, and since lawyers,
particularly claimants' lawyers, play such important roles in brokering
and exploiting gaps in understandings, we ought not be surprised
when the customers turn on the brokers, accusing them of creating the
gaps. By the same token, successful brokerage results in shared un-
derstandings, and shared understandings are not funny. Stories of
healed misunderstandings, bridged gaps, and promises fulfilled are
part of our culture. Nevertheless, they are parts that move us beyond
the world of jokes and popular legends, and into land of myth and
religious faith.
